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Abstract
As defined by IEEE 802.15.6 standard, channel sharing is a potential method to coordinate
inter-network interference among Medical Body Area Networks (MBANs) that are close to
one another. However, channel sharing opens up new vulnerabilities as selfish MBANs
may manipulate their online channel requests to gain unfair advantage over others. In this
paper, we address this issue by proposing a truthful online channel sharing algorithm and a
companion protocol that allocates channel efficiently and truthfully by punishing MBANs for
misreporting their channel request parameters such as time, duration and bid for the chan-
nel. We first present an online channel sharing scheme for unit-length channel requests and
prove that it is truthful. We then generalize our model to settings with variable-length chan-
nel requests, where we propose a critical value based channel pricing and preemption
scheme. A bid adjustment procedure prevents unbeneficial preemption by artificially raising
the ongoing winner’s bid controlled by a penalty factor λ. Our scheme can efficiently detect
selfish behaviors by monitoring a trust parameter α of each MBAN and punish MBANs from
cheating by suspending their requests. Our extensive simulation results show our scheme
can achieve a total profit that is more than 85% of the offline optimummethod in the typical
MBAN settings.
Introduction
Medical Body Area Networks (MBANs) are key technology to facilitate ubiquitous healthcare
services for patient management such as remote patient monitoring, disability management
and remote control of wireless devices. MBANs can be used to monitor vital body signs such as
heart rate, temperature, blood pressure, electrocardiogram (ECG), electroencephalogram
(EEG) and pH level of patients. By replacing cables with wireless links, MBANs can provide
less invasive and more comfortable ways to monitor a patient, both in and outside the hospital
environment and are efficient since MBANs pose minimal infection risks.
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Unlike cellular networks, MBANs are randomly distributed networks where two or more of
them may deeply overlap and interfere with each other due to the limited available frequency
bands. For example in a crowded bus more than 10 people could sit close to each other, such
that each person’s MBANmay severely interfere with the other MBANs in the vicinity. Such
severe interference will decrease the Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR) potentially
risking patients’ lives.
To mitigate the severe inter-network interference among overlapping MBANs, IEEE
802.15.6 standard [1] proposed several interference mitigation schemes such as beacon shift-
ing, channel hopping and channel sharing (i.e., active superframe interleaving), but has not
described the underlying details that relate to a specific protocol and algorithm to achieve low
or no interference. In this paper, we explore the problem of channel sharing for the self coexis-
tence of multiple and deeply overlapping MBANs.
Channel sharing among MBANs introduces significant design challenges because of the
mobility and safety requirements of MBANs. First, the channel sharing scheme must be on
demand, so that MBANs can request channel access frame by frame. Second, unlike the previ-
ous studies on channel assignment (e.g., [2, 3]), the channel access scheme has to make deci-
sions on-the-fly, i.e., without the knowledge of future events such as which networks will
subsequently join or leave the channel sharing spectrum. Third, channel sharing must be self
enforcing so that each MBAN will benefit from sharing the channel with other MBANs instead
of operating uncooperatively and causing interference to others. Finally, the channel sharing
scheme must enforce truthfulness so that no single MBAN can gain unfair advantage by
manipulating its channel request parameters and thereby denying access to other legitimate
MBANs.
In this paper, we model the channel sharing problem as an online channel access auction,
wherein the participating users (i.e., MBANs) will request channel access whenever channel
bandwidth is needed to support the communications in the networks. According to the online
auction theory [4, 5], each request consists of a monetary bid and channel access information
which includes the start time, end time and channel access length that could be utilized in the
channel sharing problem. One user in the network takes the role of an auctioneer. The auction-
eer processes the requests on-the-fly, and forwards appropriate channel access grantmessages
to all the users. By decoding the channel access grants, each user can access the channel that is
granted to him. In this way, users can request and share the channel with their neighbours
thereby avoiding collisions which may lead to severe inter-network interference.
Although the online auction based channel access scheme seems to address the problem on
inter MBAN interference in an efficient way, it opens up vulnerabilities for selfish users who
could try to gain an unfair advantage over others by manipulating their request parameters.
For example, a user can falsely report its channel request in terms of the channel access dura-
tion, start time and end time, or bid to get more channel bandwidth at a lower cost. Manipula-
tion of channel access requests can result in the blocking of other users from transmitting their
packets. Therefore, an efficient online channel access auction design for MBANs’ coexistence
needs to address this critical problem so that misbehaving users will be punished and as a
result, channel bandwidth can be fairly shared among users.
To discourage users from manipulating their channel access requests, we propose an online
truthful channel sharing scheme that maximizes users’ profit if and only if users truthfully
report their channel requests. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to address
both the network coexistence issue of MBANs (defined in IEEE 802.15.6 standard) as well as
truthful channel sharing problem simultaneously.
Our proposed scheme combines a monotone channel allocation rule with a payment mech-
anism. The monotone channel allocation rule allocates the channel to the user with the highest
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bid who has so far not been allocated the channel in the current frame. Apart from the channel
allocation rule, we propose a payment mechanism that computes the payment for each success-
ful bidder of each frame. The central idea with payments is that a user that is allocated a chan-
nel pays the smallest satisfaction value it could have reported and still received an allocation.
We prove that the proposed channel sharing scheme is truthful and can achieve the overall
high competitive ratio and profit.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We analyse the truthful practical channel sharing problem in MBANs. We find that the
channel allocation monotonicity is necessary for achieving truthfulness and also show that
payment must be bid-independent and satisfy monotonicity requirements with respect to the
start-time and end-time, channel access length and bid.
• Driven by the monotonic allocation methodology, we design efficient online channel sharing
schemes for both unit-length and variable-length request cases. We apply a trust factor α to
monitor the selfish behaviour of users and a penalty factor λ based bid adjustment to prevent
unbeneficial preemption thereby maximizing the overall profit. We prove that our proposed
methods are indeed truthful.
• We design a practical channel sharing protocol for IEEE 802.15.6 MBANs based on the
truthful channel sharing schemes proposed above. In the protocol, we define a self CO-exis-
tence Period (COPE) based frame structure together with the request and grant schemes to
facilitate channel sharing among multiple MBANs.
• Finally, we conduct extensive simulation based experiments to analyze the performance of
the proposed truthful channel sharing algorithm and the companion protocol to show that
our proposed scheme maintains fairness while achieving a total profit that is more than 85%
of the offline optimum.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The Methods section first defines the channel
sharing problem for the coexistence for multiple overlapping MBANs. We then propose a
channel sharing scheme that is truthful along with a channel allocation and payment rule set to
solve the channel sharing problem. A practical channel sharing protocol is developed based on
the IEEE 802.15.6 standard. In the Results Section, the performance of the protocol is analyzed
using simulation based experiments. In the Discussion section, we contrast our approach to the
channel sharing problem with the existing works and conclude with a brief discussion of future
work.
Methods
Channel Sharing Problem Model
We consider n users, i.e., MBANs sharing a unique channel frame by frame, and each frame is
identical for all the users. A central authority, for example, one of the MBANs together with
other management entities, decides the allocation of each frame to n users. The decision and
nomination of the central authority is outside the scope of the paper. In other words, we
assume that each user will trust the central authority and is satisfied by the outcome of the auc-
tion. Upon detecting a need for channel bandwidth from the application layer of a node, users
send requests to the central authority to access the channel for a specific time period. Each
request of the user i is characterized by a tuple vi = (ai, di, li, wi). We refer to ai and di as the
request start time and end time respectively, and refer to li and wi as channel length and bid
accordingly. Time is slotted frame by frame. In our design, we require that the maximum chan-
nel length of each request is Δ frames. All the requests arrive in the channel sharing window
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and have a channel length between [1, Δ], i.e., li 2 [1, Δ] indicating the number of frames
required. We have ai  di, 0< li  (di − ai) and 0 wi<1. Each user can participate in the
channel sharing procedure by simply sending its request vi to the central authority. Upon
receiving the requests, the central authority allocates each user a subset of the frames so that
users are assigned disjoint subsets, during which the communication within that MBAN can
take place according to the IEEE 802.15.6 standard for MBANs. In this paper, we assume a sim-
ple scenario where there is only one channel available. We leave it as a future work to extend
the proposed channel sharing and auction schemes to the case where multiple channels are
available.
In this paper, we model the above channel sharing problem as an online auction where each
user (bidder) submits requests vi to the auctioneer (central authority) which allocates the under-
lying channel to users. The online auction procedure is triggered by the arrival of a new request
or the departure of the current winner. The online channel sharing scheme needs to make deci-
sions on-the-fly, i.e., without the knowledge of oncoming future requests. As a result, the overall
performance of online channel sharing can be largely degraded if users deliberately try to manip-
ulate their requests. We use v = (v1, v2, . . ., vn) to denote the requests from n users. The auction
based online channel sharing scheme includes a channel allocation rule q and a payment rule p,
where q(v) = (q1, q2, . . ., qn) represents the channel allocation result, and p(v) = (p1, p2, . . ., pn)
represents the amount user i needs to pay. Since we consider one channel in this paper, we havePn
i
ai ¼ 1. We will assume that users have a quasi-linear profit function, so the profit of user i for
allocation qi(v) and pi(v) is qi(v)wi − pi(v).
To evaluate the performance of an online algorithm, we usually compare its performance
with that of an offline optimal algorithm. We define the performance of the online channel
sharing problemA as the competitive ratio r Að Þ ¼ mins AðsÞOPTðsÞ, where s represents any possible
sequence of requests. OPT(s) is the profit produced by the optimum offline method andAðsÞ is
the profit produced by the online channel sharing scheme. Our design goal is to maximize the
competitive ratio while maintaining the truthfulness, i.e., malicious users can’t improve their
profits.
The flexibility of the online auction method makes the channel sharing design procedure
difficult and challenging. Selfish and malicious users can utilize this flexibility to manipulate
their requests to control the auction outcome so as to gain an unfair advantage over others. In
online channel sharing, users can cheat by not only rigging their channel length and their bids
for accessing the channel, but also by falsely reporting their start and end times for accessing
the channel. A good online channel access design needs to be resistant to these selfish and mali-
cious behaviors. One well-known solution is to make the online auction truthful, i.e., no user
can improve its profit by misreporting the request.
It has been shown that it is impossible to achieve a bounded competitive ratio on the effi-
ciency of the truthful scheme without any restriction being imposed upon the types of misre-
porting [6]. In this paper, we assume that users are selfish; as a result a user will not report
channel request that has a start-time earlier than its true start-time and an end-time later than
its true end-time. This is a practical and reasonable assumption for MBAN channel sharing
problem, because each user will not benefit if it reports the channel usage time to be earlier
than it really needs it. In addition, delaying its channel usage will be disadvantageous to the
user. Since each user is selfish, it will only misreport its channel request with no earlier start-
time and no later end-time.
In this paper, we propose a truthful online channel scheme. If we use v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ; l0i ;w0iÞ to
denote the selfish request and vi = (ai, di, li, wi) the true request, we have
Truthful Channel Sharing for Medical Body Area Networks
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a
0
i > ai; d
0
i < di; w
0
i < wi, and l
0
i > li. We are interested in designing a truthful online channel
sharing scheme in which for every v = (v1, v2, . . ., vn) with vi = (ai, di, li, wi) and every
v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ; l0i ;w0iÞ, we have qiðvÞwi  piðvÞ  qiðv0i ; viÞw0i  piðv0i ; viÞ, where v−i = (v1, . . .,
vi−1, vi+1, . . ., vn), i.e., the profit of user i is maximized if and only if it submits the request for
the channel access truthfully.
The truthfulness requirement makes the online channel sharing problem described above
significantly difficult. Users may be selfish and seek to manipulate their channel access requests
to control the channel allocation result. Since the channel access request is time based, a selfish
user can not only rig its channel length, satisfaction value, but also its start and end time. This
makes the design of a truthful payment rule that is resistant to all possible misreports extremely
difficult. A truthful mechanism might suffer severe degradation in efficiency in order to bal-
ance the tradeoff between the truthfulness and efficiency.
Truthful Channel Sharing Scheme
We propose a truthful channel sharing scheme for the coexistence of multiple MBANs. The
truthful channel sharing scheme can enforce users to send their true channel access requests by
properly defining the channel allocation and payment rules. We now describe our design in
detail. We first look at the scenario where channel access length for each request is unit-length,
and then we present the solution for the variable length case. We then design the protocol to
support the channel sharing methods based on IEEE 802.15.6 architecture. We derive the fol-
lowing definition of the truthfulness property based on the model given above:
Definition 1 ((ai, di, li, wi)-Truthful Channel Sharing): Let vi = (ai, di, li, wi) represent user i’s
true request based on the current bandwidth request of its applications. A channel sharing
scheme is (ai, di, li, wi)-truthful if and only if no user i can improve its profit by submitting a false
request v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ; l0i ;w0iÞ which has a0i > ai; d0i < di; w0i < wi, and l0i > li.
The general design guideline to enforce truthfulness is to make the channel access allocation
monotonic and to apply critical-value based pricing by charging each winner the minimum bid
required to win the auction [6]. The monotonic allocation makes sure that a user can only win
the channel access auction by bidding higher than a threshold bid so as to resist bid cheating.
We allow a preemption feature to do a tradeoff between users’ profit and the channel efficiency.
Now we give a formal definition of monotonic channel allocation:
Definition 2 (Monotonic Channel Allocation): A channel allocation is monotonic if a
request vi = (ai, di, li, wi) dominates the request v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ; l0i ;w0iÞ denoted by vi  v0i , i.e.
a
0
i > ai; d
0
i < di; w
0
i < wi, or l
0
i > li, we have qi(v)qi(v0), where vj ¼ v0j for j 6¼ i, i.e., if a user
wins the auction by submitting request v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ; l0i ;w0iÞ, it will win the auction by submitting
request vi = (ai, di, li, wi) assuming all other factors remain the same.
Unit-length Channel Access. In this section, we consider the unit-length case where each
time a user requests only one frame, i.e., li = 1. We can then simplify the channel access request
by defining it as vi = (ai, di, wi). In the online channel sharing process, each user submits its
request for channel accessto the auctioneer whenever it finds that its MBAN requires some
bandwidth for access to the communication between its coordinator and the MBAN end
devices. This triggers the channel allocation decision process. This decision process com-
mences at the beginning of each superframe wherein new user requests arrive for channel
bandwidth, or when a previous winner finishes its usage of the channel. We call this type of a
frame a critical frame in this paper.
Driven by the monotonic allocation methodology above, we apply the following channel
allocation rule q (HIGHEST BID FIRST) to allocate frames to users: for each critical frame t,
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we allocate frame t to user i with the pending request that satifies the following requirement:
wi = max{wj : aj  t dj}, i.e., the highest bid user for the current frame will be served first. We
now show that allocation rule q has the monotonicity property as below:
Theorem 1 The HIGHEST BID FIRST channel allocation scheme q is monotonic, i.e.,
qi(v) qi(v0) if vi  v0i .
PROOF. Assume a user i loses the auction when she submits a request vi = (ai, di, wi). Now
instead of vi = (ai, di, wi), she tries a false request by v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ;w0iÞ, where vi  v0i . Since a0i >
ai; d
0
i < di and w
0
i < wi, we have
qiðvÞ ¼ qiðai; a0i;wiÞ þ qiða0i; d0i ;wiÞ þ qiðd0i ; di;wiÞ  qiða0i; d0i ;wiÞ  qiða0i; d0i ;w0iÞ ¼ qiðv0iÞ:
For the truthful property to be implementable, the pricing scheme has to be bid independent
and monotonic. Otherwise, users can increase their profit by cheating. In online channel auc-
tion, a user’s price, when winning the auction, depends on other pending users and their bids.
Since the set of pending users depends on time, we need to design a pricing scheme that can
remove the time dependency and still be monotonic. This means the price charged when a user
cheats is no less than that when it reports the same truthfully. Taking the above into account,
we define the payment rule p as:
piðvÞ ¼ qiðvÞwi 
Z wi
0
qi ðai; di; xÞ; við Þdx ð1Þ
In other words, a user will only have to pay the smallest value it could have reported in
order to receive an allocation. The above mentioned payment rule p can be equivalently
expressed as follows:
piðvÞ ¼ minfw0i : qi ai; di;w0i
 
; vi
  ¼ 1g ð2Þ
The payment rule p defined by Eq (2) depends only on ai, di and v−i so it is value independent.
It is also monotonic in that it is non-decreasing in ai and non-increasing in di. We now show
that the HIGHEST BID FIRST allocation rule q combined with the pricing rule in Eq (2) con-
stitutes a truthful channel sharing mechanism as defined in theorem 2 below:
Theorem 2 Let q: vn ! {0, 1}n be the HIGHEST BID FIRST channel allocation rule above,
and p be the payment rule defined by Eq (1), then the channel sharing scheme (q, p) is truthful.
PROOF. Let’s assume the channel sharing scheme (q, p) is not truthful, i.e., there is a user i,
a request vector v of true types with vi = (ai, di, wi) and a non-truthful request v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ;w0iÞ,
where vi  v0i , such that the profit of user i if it derives from being truthful is strictly greater
than the profit if it submits request truthfully, i.e., qiðv0i ; viÞw0i  piðv0i ; viÞ > qiðvÞw0i  piðvÞ.







i ; xÞ; xÞ; viÞdx >
Z wi
0
qiððai; di; xÞ; viÞdx ð3Þ
Since we have w
0




qiðða0i; d0i ; xÞ; xÞ; viÞdx >
R wi
0
qiððai; di; xÞ; viÞdx, which contradicts Eq (3). This con-
tradiction establishes the truthfulness of the mechanism (q, p).
Based on the discussion above, we now propose the overall unit-length truthful channel
sharing algorithm κ. Each user i has a trust parameter α which is updated each time a frame is





wheremi is user i’s money left before the allocation, γ is the aggressive factor which
determines how rapidly its trust will decrease as a function of its current money left, andMi is
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the money that user i is allocated by the central authority. The penalty factor λ is a parameter
to decide whether a high bid request can preempt the current low bid request but with unfin-
ished pre-allocated frames. A high penalty factor λmeans that the auctioneer will assign a
higher priority to the current winner. Algorithm 1 provides the steps to share of channels of
unit length in detail.
Algorithm 1 Unit Length Truthful Online Channel Sharing κ
Input: A set of requests v from n users for current frame t; current payment
state mi for user i.
Output: user k that is allocated to the current frame t
1: k = ;
2: list = SortBidInNonInceasingOrder(n, t);
3: list = DeleteExpiredRequest(n, t);
4: for i = HeadOfRequestList(list) do
5: piðvÞ ¼ minfw0i : qiððai; di;w0iÞ; viÞ ¼ 1g;
6: if mi − pi  0 then




11: for i = HeadOfRequestList(list) do
12: mi ¼ mi  γpi
13: if i = k then
14: ai ¼ miγpiMi ;
15: else
16: ai ¼ miþðγpiÞ=nMi ;
17: end if
18: end for
Variable-length Channel Access. In this section, we consider the scenario where users
submit requests with a variable number of frames each time. As a result, a request now can be
expressed as vi = (ai, di, li, wi), where li is the number of frames that user i requests. User i will
gain value wi if its request is met, i.e., it is allocated at least li number of frames between (ai, bi).
Note that the number of frames li do not have to be continues.
The allocation q needs to be monotonic as well, i.e., given the start time and end time of
user i, the higher the user i bids, the higher likehood that user i wins. To achieve monotonicity,
we apply the same allocation policy as that in the unit length case, i.e., for each frame the auc-
tioneer chooses the qualified user with the highest bid as the winner. It is obvious that if there
is no new request coming, the current winner i will win the auction repeatedly until it uses up
all of its allocated li frames and leaves the auction. This means allocation decision occurs only
when a winner finishes its channel usage and releases the currently occupied channel, or when
a new request arrives.
Since the allocated frames do not have to be contiguous and preemption can increase the
overall auction profit, we allow preemption, i.e., if the newly arrived request has a higher bid,
we may consider to allocate the current frame to it, so that the overall profit can be improved.
This however introduces the risk that the current winner may not be able to obtain its
requested frames. This implies that in the end this user will get zero profit although it has been
allocated some frames already. Considering this negative effect of preemption, the auctioneer
should preempt a winner only if the newly arrived user offers a significantly higher bid.
To prevent unbeneficial preemption, we introduce a bid adjustment procedure to control
the preemption frequency by artificially raising the ongoing winner’s bid to raise its priority.
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For a winning user i with request vi = (ai, di, li, wi) and the current frame t, suppose user i has
totally been allocated li frames since the start time ai, then we will treat user i’s bid at time t as:
wti ¼ wili λ
φi  wi where φi ¼ li =li indicates the current state of allocation. Since we would like
to raise the priority of user i when it is close to getting the total number of requested frames, we
let λ 1, which will determine the auctioneer’s preemption aggressiveness. When λ = 1, it
becomes a conventional preemption case. By increasing λ, the auctioneer will assign a higher
priority to the current winner since it will add more bids to the winner to protect it from being
preempted by the newly arrived user. When λ!1, wti ¼ 1, then the winner will never be
preempted until its current request is met. In this case, there is no preemption.
We charge the users who have gained partial access to the requested channel as well. The
pricing for user i takes place after the allocation, i.e., when t> di. Let pti denote the price for
winning frame t. We apply the same policy as in the unit length case to price each frame, i.e.,
for frame t we charge user ptiðvÞ ¼ minfw0i : qtiððai; di; li;w0iÞ; vtiÞ ¼ 1g, where vti ¼
ð. . . ; ðai1; di1; li1;wti1Þ; ðaiþ1; diþ1; liþ1;wtiþ1Þ; . . . ; ðan; dn; ln;wtnÞ Þ.
Let Sdi denote the set of the frames allocated to user i, l
d
i be the number of the allocated
frames after end time di. We call pi the minimum per-frame price, then we have
pi ¼ mint2Sd
i
ptiðvÞ. We charge user i by pildi so as to remove the time dependency. This is
because under the assumption of no early arrival and no late departure, we have
ða0i; d0iÞ  ðai; diÞ, so that mint2S0 di p
t




i is the set of frames allocated
to user i with request v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ; l0i ;w0iÞ. This implies that the price charge to user i is higher
when it cheats.
To resist users’ selfish tendency of reporting a larger number of frames than what is





, then the request will be rejected, where N is the number of users and βi decides how
user i’s request can be dependant on user i’s financial state indicated bymi. For example βi can
be calculated as: bi ¼ miP
j2Nmj
.
Now we summarize the channel sharing scheme described above as follows. We call a frame
t critical frame if a newly arrived request starts at frame t, or a previous allocation completes at




, it will be rejected. For the current frame t, we calcu-
late user i’s frame bid by wti ¼ wili λ
φi , and then apply the HIGHEST BID FIRST allocation policy
to allocate the frame to user i with the highest bid wti that still has enough money to pay for the
usage of this frame. For each user i that has been allocated Sdi number of frames from the
request vi = (ai, di, li, wi), we apply the minimum per-frame price scheme, i.e., pti ¼
mint2Sdi p
t
iðvÞ to charge it for each frame allocated, so that the overall price user i has to pay is
ptiLi.
Algorithm 2 lists the detailed steps of channel sharing for variable length case. It consists of
allocation and pricing algorithms as depicted above together with the related protocols.
Algorithm 2 Variable Length Truthful Online Channel Sharing ω
Input: A set of requests v from n users for li; current payment state mi for
user i.
Output: user k that is allocated to the current frame t
1: k = ;
2: list = DeleteExpiredRequest(n, t);
3: for i = HeadOfRequestList(list) do
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5: DeleteRequestFromList(list, i);
6: end if




10: for i = HeadOfRequestList(list) do
11: pti ¼ minfw0i : qiððai; di;w0iÞ; viÞ ¼ 1g;
12: if mi > 0 then




17: for i = HeadOfRequestList(list) do
18: if if user i has been allocated li frames then
19: pti ¼ mint2Sdi p
t
iðvÞ
20: pi ¼ pti  li
21: end if
22: mi ¼ mi  γpi
23: if i = k then
24: ai ¼ miγpiMi ;
25: else
26: ai ¼ miþðγpiÞ=nMi ;
27: end if
28: end for
We now prove that the channel sharing scheme for variable length described above is truth-
ful by means of the following theorem:
Theorem 3 The channel sharing scheme for the variable length case is (a, d, l, w)-truthful, i.e.,
no user i can improve its profit by submitting a manipulated request v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ; l0i ;w0iÞ with
a
0
i > ai; d
0
i < di; w
0
i < wi, and l
0
i > li.
PROOF. Suppose that there is a user i, a vector v of true request with vi = (ai, di, li, wi), and a
manipulated non-truthful request v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ; l0i ;w0iÞ, where a0i > ai; d0i < di; w0i < wi, and
l
0





, where βi and N
are unknown to user i, no user can benefit by lying l
0
i > li. We now show that user i cannot ben-
efit from rigging its bid wi. For frame t, Theorem 1 ensures that there exists a critical value such
that user i wins only if it bids no less than this value. The proof of truthfulness is similar to that
in the unit length case. We do not discuss the details of the proof.
We now consider the arrival time and end time. The monotonicity of the allocation rule
makes sure that if user i wins with request v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ; li; wiÞ, it wins with vi = (ai, di, li, wi).
The minimum price p
0
i ¼ mint2S0i p
t
iðv0iÞ that user i needs to pay for winning the auction within
ða0i; d0iÞ is less than pi ¼ mint2Si ptiðvÞ with (ai, di). Since a user i who loses does not affect the
allocation result, we have L
0
i  Li. Then we have ui ¼ wi  piLi  u0i ¼ w0i  p0iL0i , which means
that user i cannot improve its profit by submitting a manipulated request v
0
i ¼ ða0i; d0i ; l0i ;w0iÞ
with a
0
i > ai; d
0
i < di; w
0
i < wi, and l
0
i > li. Based on the above, we prove that the channel shar-
ing scheme above is indeed truthful in its implementation.
Truthful On Demand Self Coexistence Protocol
Self coexistence is critical for the safety of MBAN. Driven by the above channel allocation and
pricing methods, we now design the Truthful On Demand Self Coexistence(TODEC) protocol
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in detail based on the framework of IEEE 802.15.6 standard. TODEC is used to achieve efficient
and adaptive self coexistence among overlapping IEEE 802.15.6 MBANs.
The superframe structure in the self coexistence mode is shown in Fig 1. In addition to the
fields of the conventional frame, TODEC defines a self coexistence period (COPE), which con-
sists of coexistence beacon (COB) and coexistence window (COW). During the COB and
COW period, no communication within MBAN should happen which is indicated by the con-
ventional beacon (B). The coordinator of the central authority MBAN (CA_MBAN) broad-
casts COB to notify other coordinators of MBANs that it works in the self coexistence mode
and is ready to take other MBANs requests to share the channel. COB also provides the syn-
chronization information for all MBANs in the channel sharing scenario through CS Preamble,
Superframe Number and other CS IE fields. COW period is based on CSMA/CA which allows
coordinators of MBANs to send joint requests to CA_MBAN coordinator, the channel request,
i.e., vi = (ai, di, li, wi) for MBAN i, and channel grant that tells the channel allocation result.
Each MBAN in the coexistence mode transmits its allocated number of frames after decoding
the broadcast channel grant message during the COW period. The details of the COB, such as
CS Preamble and CS IEs are omitted because of space limitations. Note: For the frame defini-
tion, please refer to IEEE 802.15.6 standard [1].
A channel sharing based self coexistence mode is trigged by events such as a node or a coor-
dinator detecting severe interference based on the received SINR from the medium as shown
in Fig 2. In order to participate in the online channel access auction described in the previous
sections, each MBAN (user) needs to get synchronized to the auctioneer, i.e., CA_MBAN.
When a MBAN decides to enter into the self coexistence mode, its coordinator firstly searches
for nearby CA_MBAN by decoding COB. During the COW period, the coordinator can send a
CS joint message to the CA_MBAN to join the channel sharing process. Requests will then be
sent to the auctioneer during the COW from the coordinator of MBAN to that of CA_MBAN
based on CSMA/CA media access scheme. CA_MBAN will run the truthful channel allocation
method proposed above to allow multiple MBANs to share the underlying channel on a frame
by frame basis. The CA_MBAN will broadcast the channel access grants to users as part of the
COB or in the grant message during COW period. This message indicates which frame has
been allocated to which user. Fig 2 shows the above process.
Fig 1. Superframe Structure of a self CO-existence Period (COPE) Protocol. In addition to fields of the
conventional frame, the superframe defines a COPE field which consists of coexistence beacon (COB) and
coexistence window (COW).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148376.g001
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There are four types of messages needed to support the channel sharing process: Channel
Sharing Joint (CS Joint), Channel Sharing grant (CS Grant), Channel Request and Grant as
shown in Fig 2. CS Joint message is transmitted by the MBAN coordinator to CA_MBAN coor-
dinator to initiate the channel sharing process. CS Grant contains the jointing request acknowl-
edgement information. Grant message contains the confirmation of the channel allocation
result. Based on this framework, more flexible schemes may be added, for example, a MBAN
can be granted periodical frames and it can ask for more frames or cancel previously allocated
frames. The details are omitted here because of space limitations.
The channel allocation decision takes place after the COW period where users submit
requests to the auctioneer. The allocation decision algorithm will be trigged only if there is at
least one new request arrival or a winner finishes its channel usage and releases the channel.
When joining the channel sharing process, user i will be assigned a trust parameter by the auc-
tioneer. The auctioneer does this based on the overall QoS requirements of the concerned
MBAN and its explanation is beyond the scope of this paper. Each time the allocation algo-
rithm first deletes the expired requests according to the timing information, i.e., ai and di, it
will apply the HIGHEST BID FIRST allocation policy to allocate the next frame to user i with
the highest bid that still has a high trust to pay for the usage of the this frame, i.e.,mi − pi 0.
Complexity Analysis
We now analyze time and space complexity of our proposed online channel sharing algorithm.
As is known, time complexity is a function describing the amount of time an algorithm takes
while space complexity describes the amount of memory (space) an algorithm takes, in terms
of the amount of inputs to the algorithm. In our algorithm, the amount of inputs is the number
of users n for the unit length channel sharing scheme and the number of users n and the num-
ber of frames Δ each user requests for the variable length channel sharing scheme.
The main component of the unit length channel sharing scheme, as described in Algorithm
1, is to find the highest bid user and the second highest bid user. The algorithm consists of one
sorting algorithm and two for loops. For time complexity analysis of the algorithm, a compari-
son sorting algorithm requires linearithmic time O(n log n), and the number of repeated times
Fig 2. Example of TODEC Process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148376.g002
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of each loop is O(n). In the first for loop, a variable, v−i, in themin{.} function has (n − 1) ele-
ments; then, the complexity of thismin{.} function is O(n). So, the complexity of this loop is
O(n2). The second loop’s complexity is O(n). Therefore, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(n log n) + O(n2) + O(n) = O(n2). For space complexity, the algorithm needs space to save the
request list which has n elements. Other parts of the algorithm, such as the sorting algorithm
and for loops, perform operations on the request list. For each element in the request list, the
memory consumed by these operations is constant. The memory consumption increases when
there are more users. Hence, its space complexity is linear O(n).
Similarly complexity analysis on the variable length channel sharing scheme, as described in
Algorithm 2, is presented as below. Algorithm 2 has one sorting algorithm as well as three for
loops. For time complexity analysis, a comparison sorting algorithm is O(n log n) while each
loop repeats O(n) times. The complexity of the first and the third loop is O(n) and O(Δn),
respectively, where Δ is the number of requested frames. However, the complexity of the sec-
ond loop is O(n2) because themin{.} function in the loop has operations of O(n). Therefore,
the time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n log n) + O(Δn) + O(n2) = O(n2). For space complex-
ity, the main part of memory is for saving the request list with n elements. Likewise, its space
complexity is O(n).
In the next section, we conduct simulations to study the profit trends. In terms of the overall
profit performance, we compare it against the earliest deadline first (EDF) and Weighted Fair
Queue (WFQ) algorithms.
Results
In this section, we discuss the result of extensive simulations to study the performance of our
algorithm ω, specifically, in terms of the competitive ratio and network profit in typical settings
of MBANs. In our simulations, we generate nMBANs that are randomly placed in a 4 × 4
square meter area and the coverage of each MBAN is 5 meters. We assume any transmission
within 4 meters will conflict with each other if the transmitters request the same channel and
the same time frames. We generate random channel requests with random bid values and time
requirements for truthful MBANs. For a request (a, d, l, w), bid w is uniformly distributed in
[0, π], the time gap between two successive requests is uniformly distributed in [1, δ] and dura-
tion d − a is uniformly distributed in [l, φ]. The duration is uniformly distributed in [1, ρ],
where selfish users can manipulate π, δ, φ and ρ. We take the total service time as 10000 time
frames which is large enough compared to the time requirements of each request.
The average load of an MBAN in our simulation is (K.J)/(T.n), where K is the total number
of requests, J is the average duration of a request and n is the total number of MBANs, thus we
have J = ρ/2 and T = 10000 frames in our setting. Considering the typical applications of
MBANs, we expect the number of MBANs in a unit square meter area to be around 3 so that
the total number of MBANs in a 4 × 4 square meter area is 50.
Competitive Ratio of Algorithmω
When calculating the competitive radio of algorithm ω, various parameters, such as penalty
factor λ and aggressive factor γmay affect performnce. To see how these parameters affect per-
formance, we first fix penalty factor λ and study the competitive ratios of ω while aggressive
factor γ varies. Then we fix the aggressive factor γ and study the competitive ratios of ω while
penalty factor λ changes.
Fig 3(a) shows the competitive ratios of ω for various algorithms as a function of penalty
factor λ while aggressive factor γ is fixed. Fig 3(b) shows the competitive ratios of algorithm ω
for various algorithms as a function of aggressive factor γ while penalty factor λ is fixed. By
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configuring π, δ, φ and ρ properly, we can have a different total number of requests. We run 3
cases: 1000 requests, 5000 requests and 10,000 requests. In most cases, algorithm ωmakes a
total profit that is more than 85% of the optimum offline method.
The competitive ratio decreases when penalty factor λ increases. This is because penalty fac-
tor λ is a parameter to decide whether a high bid request can preempt the current low bid
request but with unfinished pre-allocated frames. A high penalty factor λmeans that the auc-
tioneer will assign a higher priority to the current winner since it will add more bids to the win-
ner to protect it from being preempted by the newly arrived user, and as a result, the overall
profit decreases. The competitive ratio decreases as aggressive factor γ increases. This is because
aggressive factor γ is a parameter that affects how a user’s trust parameter will be updated: a
high γmeans a user will be punished severely and may lose trust completely, and as a result, it
may miss the chance to send its bid because of it being suspended.
The total number of requests also affects the performance of ω. We observe that the compet-
itive ratio decreases when the total number of requests increases. This is because ω is conserva-
tive: the weak preemption in ω just tries to satisfy the theoretical bound which may potentially
lose some profit. Thus, when there are more requests, the optimal offline algorithm will make a
higher profit but the profit made by ω will not increase so much.
Truthfulness of Algorithmω
Truthfulness is the most important characteristic of algorithm ω. To study the truthfulness, we
introduce selfish users who manipulate their requests by controlling the π, δ, φ and ρ parame-
ters to increase their priority. We compare algorithm ω to two classic scheduling algorithms
based on the earliest deadline first (EDF) and weighted fair queuing (WFQ). EDF always serves
user k with the earliest deadline, i.e., k ¼ arg min
i2f1:::ng
ðdiÞ, while WFQ picks up the user with the
highest bid li if all the users are equal, i.e., k ¼ arg max
i2f1:::ng
ðliÞ. When a request with a larger bid is
Fig 3. Competitive Ratio. (a):λ = 16; (b):γ = 1.35.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148376.g003
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coming, WFQ will terminate the current assignment with a smaller bid value if necessary.
When a request with an earlier deadline is coming, EDF will terminate the current assignment
with a smaller bid value if necessary. The competitive ratio and fairness of these two algorithms
could be theoretically arbitrarily bad. We conduct simulations to compare them with algorithm
ω which is theoretically truthful.
In Fig 4(a) and 4(b), we plot the channel allocation result of algorithms ω, EDF and WFQ to
compare their performance. In Fig 5(a), we define users 2, 8, 10, 13 and 17 as selfish users.
Users 2 and 8 manipulate their requests by raising the bids of their requests. Users 10, 13 and
17 decrease the duration of the requests to gain channel resources. EDF and WFQ cannot
detect the selfish behaviors of users, so the selfish users benefit from manipulating their
requests. Our algorithm ω, however, maintains the trust parameter of each user and can detect
selfish users and punish them when users’ trust is low. As a result, selfish users 2, 8, 10, 13 and
17 do not obtain extra channel resources but on the contrary obtained lower channel resources
than the other truthful users as shown in Fig 6(a). Fig 6(b) shows how penalty factor λ will
affect the results.
In Fig 5(a) and 5(b), we plot the overall user profit. Our proposed algorithm ω has a high
and constant sum of profit when the number of selfish users increases. This is because the self-
ish users will be detected and some of their requests will be ignored when their trusts are low.
The EDF and the WFQ however do not have a trust monitoring scheme so that some selfish
users can gain more resources by selfishly manipulating their channel requests, and as a result
other honest users will lose channel resources and their overall utilities decrease.
In Fig 6, we plot the users’ trust. We show how the trust parameter of different type of users, i.
e,. truthful and selfish users, will behave as a function of time, i.e., as a function of the index of
the frame. In Fig 6, we manipulate users’ requests by controlling π, δ, φ and ρ, so that users 1 and
2 are selfish users and user 1 is more offensive than user 2. User 1 basically decreases duration
Fig 4. Users’ Channel Allocation vs Selfish Requests. (a):λ = 2.4; (b):λ = 1.2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148376.g004
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Fig 5. Users’Overall profit vs Selfish Users. (a): users manipulate di, li; (b): users manipulatewi.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148376.g005
Fig 6. Users’ Trust vs Selfish Users.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148376.g006
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and increases bids dramatically in order to have a higher priority. User 2 however employs a try-
and-stop policy, i.e., each time it tries to be selfish, it will monitor if it is benefiting. If it believes it
is suffering, it will try to be truthful. As a result, from Fig 6, we can see User 1’s trust is almost
zero all the time, i.e., it has a bad reputation and will not be allocated any resource. User 2 is ran-
domly trying to manipulate its request parameters and its trust is quite random as well. The
truthful user has a good reputation and has a trust value of more than 0.8 in this setting.
Discussion
In this paper, we have studied online channel sharing problem for medical body area networks
(MBANs) where a set of MBANs will bid for leasing a channel for a certain time duration in
different locations. We model the channel sharing problem as an online auction for channel
access. Our proposed scheme combines a monotonic channel allocation rule and a payment
mechanism. We have proposed truthful channel sharing methods for both the unit length and
variable length cases. Based on the methods, we designed a flexible and practical self coexis-
tence protocol based on IEEE 802.15.6 standard for MBANs. For a number of variants, we
have experimentally shown that the competitive ratios of our methods are within small con-
stant factors of the optimum. Our algorithm results in a profit that is almost optimum and can
maintain fairness by detecting and punishing selfish MBANs. Our extensive simulation results
show that our scheme can achieve a total profit that is close to that of the offline optimum
method in the typical MBAN settings. Truthfulness of our scheme helps to achieve fair channel
sharing when there are selfish users, as a result it can achieve a higher total profit than that of
other algorithms.
We now discuss related work on allocating channels and highlight similarities as well differ-
ences between our work and the existing works. Efficient and truthful mechanisms for various
dynamic spectrum assignment problems were proposed [7, 8], as well as double spectrum auc-
tions with provable performance [9, 10]. All these proposals are based on offline models. For
the online models, spectrum allocation and truthful schemes in situations where secondary
users could bid arbitrarily were proposed [11, 12].
In our work, we use an online model which is similar to the online job scheduling problems
[13] to solve channel sharing among MBANs. Various online scheduling problems focus on
optimizing different objective functions. The most common objective function is makespan,
which is the length of the schedule. Suppose that we are given m identical machines, jobs arrive
one by one and no preemption is allowed for this scenario. A number of results have been
reported in the literature to improve the upper bounds [6, 10, 14] and lower bounds [15]. Clos-
ing the gap between the best lower bound [15] and the upper bound [6] is an open problem.
The case where preemption is allowed without penalty has also been investigated [16].
When jobs have deadlines, however, it is usually impossible to finish all the jobs. Thus,
another model aims to maximize the profit or the number of completed jobs. There are differ-
ent variants: preemption-restart, preemption-resume, and preemption-discard. An algorithm
was proposed [17], matching the lower bound given in [2]. An online model of maximizing the
profit of finished jobs was studied [18] where there is some relationship between the weight
and length of a job. A 4-competitive algorithm was proposed for the tight deadline case, and a
matching lower bound was given [7]. In this algorithm, it is assumed that preemption is
allowed while no penalties will be charged. It was proven that a suitable choice of channel shar-
ing and incentive schemes can reduce collusion incentives among participating nodes [12]. A
channel selection algorithm was proposed that optimally selects a channel by minimizing
queuing delay [19]. A channel allocation scheme was combined with the routing framework
with a view to maximizing the profit in the network [20]. The scheme proposed is decentralized
Truthful Channel Sharing for Medical Body Area Networks
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0148376 February 4, 2016 16 / 19
and is restricted to cognitive mesh topologies. A 2 way bargaining scheme was proposed to
force selfish SUs to cooperate with PUs so as to guarantee the PU’s QoS requirement [21]. The
scheme goes further by offering a mechanism to coordinate the available spectrum among SUs.
However, none of the studies discussed above consider the ‘truthfulness’ issue in channel
sharing.
A model for spectrum sharing based on truthful mechanisms and virtual currency was pro-
posed [22]. The model is dynamic in which SUs access opportunistically those channels not
temporarily used by PUs. It considers a particular case in which every SU estimates capacity of
a free channel according to its local information, and sends the valuation (i.e., estimated capac-
ity) to the centralized spectrum manager. This model is somewhat similar to our model, how-
ever, the proposed credit based mechanism restricts truthfulness guarantees to a single run
where a ‘run’ represents a spectrum usage opportunity. Several recent studies [23–26] investi-
gated various mechanisms of evolutionary game theory to explain the cooperation among self-
ish individuals, e.g. the prisoner’s dilemma game model and the public goods game model.
A power control algorithm that uses the Signal to interference ratio (SIR) as a cost function
has been proposed [27]. The proposed algorithm achieves optimal exploitation of the spectrum
with least amount on interference. It achieves fairness by enabling all users to meet their SIR
constraints without the need to transmit at high power levels. However, this scheme lacks a
pricing scheme to manage interference. A scheme which is suitable for 802.11 wireless LANs
that operate in unsupervised contention mode was proposed [28]. Upon winning a channel,
this scheme enables the winning node to dynamically adjust its transmission opportunity (in
which a node can transmit multiple frames without releasing the channel) leading to better
bandwidth utilization and QoS provisioning. This scheme is based on the principles of game
theory. Although this scheme improves overall network performance, this scheme does not
explain how to bid for a channel successfully.
Truthful spectrum bidding was proposed based on the principles of auction theory [29].
The proposal presents an online version of truthful double auctions for spectrum allocation
where the requests arrive in an online fashion. The limitation of this scheme is that it does not
facilitate pre-empting existing spectrum usage. A neighbor centric approach for coordinating
spectrum sharing among secondary users was proposed [30]. Unlike our approach, wherein all
bidders are competing against each other, this approach restricts competing bidders (SUs) of a
node to be its immediate neighbors. By considering only the neighbors, it allows for spatial
reuse since if a primary user (PU) is using a channel then this channel becomes unavailable for
a SU that happens to be its neighbor. Other bidders not in the immediate vicinity of this PU
remain unaffected. Extending this concept a bit further, the number of channels won by a bid-
der in this scheme is a function of the cumulative demand of this bidding node’s conflicting
neighbors. If there are a several competing bidders for a set of channels then this becomes a
case of ‘excessive demand’ and the auction process proceeds to subsequent rounds with price
being incremented at each round. Furthermore, each channel that is bid has some sort of a
preference number. The approach makes available for selection only that channel that has the
least preference number of the winning bidder’s neighbors, thereby reducing the overall num-
ber of bidders. However, unlike our approach, it does not examine specific issues such as the
overlapping channel allocation scenario and allocating channels of variable length.
In our future work, we will be dealing with the selection of the central authority without the
infrastructure, and the interference from other legacy wireless systems working at the same fre-
quency as MBANs. Our model can also be potentially used in many other application areas,
where dynamic spectrum sharing is required, such as cognitive radio networks, wireless indus-
trial control systems, TV white space spectrum management, bandwidth allocation
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management for cellular phone and vehicular networks and other futuristic mobile broadband
systems.
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